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ABSTRACT
Against a backdrop of tensions related to EU membership, we find levels of online
abuse toward UK MPs reach a new high. Race and religion have become pressing
topics globally, and in the UK this interacts with “Brexit” and the rise of social media
to create a complex social climate in which much can be learned about evolving
attitudes. In 8 million tweets by and to UK MPs in the first half of 2019, religious
intolerance scandals in the UK’s two main political parties attracted significant
attention. Furthermore, high profile ethnic minority MPs started conversations on
Twitter about race and religion, the responses to which provide a valuable source
of insight. We found a significant presence for disturbing racial and religious abuse.
We also explore metrics relating to abuse patterns, which may affect its impact. We
find “burstiness” of abuse doesn’t depend on race or gender, but individual factors
may lead to politicians having very different experiences online.
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction
There is little doubt that the rise in social media usage is having far-reaching effects
on society (e.g. Milan, 2015), creating a need for vigilant commentary as the landscape
shifts on almost a daily basis, in order to resist pernicious effects. Globally we have
seen a rise in populism, fuelled by social media (Engesser et al., 2017). Socially and
politically, the impact of technological developments may be dramatic; for example
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) highlight the role of social media in the 2016 US pres-
idential election. The United Kingdom, at the time of writing, are negotiating their
exit from the European Union (“Brexit”) as a consequence of a referendum outcome
that social media may have played a role in bringing about (Gorrell et al., 2019).
In the spring of 2019, with Brexit forming a prominent but complex background
issue to UK political dialogue, the subject of racism and religious tolerance arose in
several notable ways. Immigration has been a key topic in the Brexit debate, centring
on the UK’s ability to control who enters. This, in conjunction with other global fac-
tors, gave oxygen to xenophobia with regards to migration of citizens (Rzepnikowska,
2019).1 Dialogue is complex, however, with a strong presence of anti-racist voices, and
CONTACT Genevieve Gorrell. Email: g.gorrell@sheffield.ac.uk
1https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/brexit-prejudice-scientists-link
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the emergence of a polarized discussion in which identity politics may also be perceived
as problematic (Fukuyama, 2018).
With the election in 2015 of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party (the
opposition party in the UK’s de facto two party system) allegations of antisemitism
in the party began to arise. The UK left wing has had a sympathy for the plight
of Palestinians since the 1980s, but this hasn’t previously been associated with anti-
semitism (Kolpinskaya, 2014). Additionally Boris Johnson, UK prime minister at the
time of writing, has been found to have made several controversial comments about
Islam,2 which, alongside incidents involving other Conservative politicians, has led to
accusations of Islamophobia within the ruling Conservative Party.
In the same period, ethnic minority politicians received abuse that was in some ways
unprecedented. We gathered a corpus of eight million tweets authored by UK MPs or
sent in reply to them in the period of January to June 2019. We find that Brexit and
Europe constitute the dominant topics. We also find that MP David Lammy, whose
parents come from Guyana, received the most abusive tweets, in absolute terms, of any
MP in that period. This means he received more abusive tweets than the then-prime
minister, Theresa May, and more than the incoming prime minister, Boris Johnson,
although Mr Johnson has long been a divisive figure who has always received high
levels of abuse in our studies. Whilst the reason an MP receives abusive tweets is
unlikely to depend only on skin colour, the matter nonetheless warrants investigation.
Diane Abbott, whose parents are Jamaican, has also spoken up about the abuse she
receives, which is widely regarded as unusual.3
These circumstances create an opportunity to explore the often complex and nu-
anced dialogue around racial and religious tolerance at a time when important transi-
tions are being negotiated, both in terms of sovereignty and in terms of the feelings and
opinions that are considered acceptable to express in civilized society. Abuse measured
as volume or percentage fails to capture the experience certain MPs have described.
Temporal variation may be a part of this (as, of course, is social context and the precise
nature of the abuse). We proceed on the basis of the following research questions:
• What abuse was received on Twitter by UK MPs in the first half of 2019? What
topics were discussed and who was targeted? How are race and religion situated
within this?
• What evidence do we find for racial and religious hate speech and discrimination
in tweets to UK MPs? What individuals, events and themes emerge? How does
this compare with other forms of discrimination in the corpus?
• How can we use temporal information to better understand the differing expe-
rience MPs have of receiving online abuse, in a way that goes beyond simple
quantity?
2. Related Work
Online fora have attracted much attention as a way of exploring political dynamics
(Colleoni et al., 2014; Conover et al., 2011; Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2010; Kaczmirek
et al., 2013; Nulty et al., 2016; Weber et al., 2012). The effect of abuse and incivility in
-foreigners-immigrants-racism-xenophobia-leave-eu-a8078586.html
2https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/15/boris-johnson-islam-muslim
-world-centuries-behind-2007-essay
3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1OZIqw5exdw
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online political discussion has also been explored. Vargo and Hopp (2017) find greater
levels of online abuse in contexts characterized by poor socioeconomic prospects, low
education levels and “low partisan polarity” (in other words, contexts characterized
by a variety of opinion). With rising inequality and the opinion-dividing subject of
Brexit, this suggests we might expect to encounter increased online abuse in the UK
at the present time. Gervais (2015) manipulates discourse in an online political forum,
and finds that uncivil language from like-minded individuals escalates the incivility
on the forum, whilst uncivil language from those in disagreement leads to withdrawal,
suggesting a factor in the creation of uncivil echo chambers online. Ru¨sel (2017) finds
provocative language use is more common than the vulgarity-centred abusive language
on which this work focuses. With regards to online abuse toward politicians, Theocharis
et al. (2016) collected tweets centred around candidates for the European Parliament
election in 2014 from Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom and France posted in
the month surrounding the election, as a means to explore the role of incivility in
politicians’ motivations to engage, and thereby Twitter’s political potential, at a time
when it seemed more hopeful that the internet could be force for political good. (The
following year, two of the same authors comment on the emerging realization that
these hopes may have been misplaced (Tucker et al., 2017)). Ward et al. (2017) also
make UK MPs their primary focus, exploring a two and a half month period running
from late 2016 to early 2017. Our earlier work has explored Twitter abuse towards
UK MPs in earlier time periods (Gorrell et al., 2018) and established trends spanning
four years (Greenwood et al., 2019) in which the topics producing strong responses
have evolved in conjunction with the political climate. Given the developments online,
concern is increasing about oﬄine threats to public figures also. In this work we follow
up on findings presented in the context of a BBC investigation4 into the increasing
levels of threat and danger MPs are exposed to.
In the context of an increasing level of online toxicity, a surge of recent interest aims
to detect abuse automatically. Schmidt and Wiegand (2017) provide a review of prior
work and methods, as do Fortuna and Nunes (2018). Whilst unintended bias has been
the subject of much research in recent years with regards to making predictive systems
that don’t penalize minorities or perpetuate stereotypes, it has only just begun to be
taken up within abuse classification (Park et al., 2018); unintended bias is a serious
issue for sociological work such as that shared here. For that reason and others we
adopt a rule-based approach here, as discussed below.
With regards to sexism, Pew (2017) find that women are twice as likely as men
to receive sexist abuse online, and are also more likely to perceive online abuse as
a serious problem. In terms of public figures, the subject of online abuse of women
politicians and journalists has been taken up in a campaign by Amnesty International,
e.g. Stambolieva (2017). A larger body of work has looked at hatred on social media
more generally (Cheng et al., 2015; Coe et al., 2014; Perry and Olsson, 2009). Williams
and Burnap (2015) and Burnap and Williams (2015) present work demonstrating the
potential of Twitter for evidencing social models of online hate crime that could sup-
port prediction, as well as exploring how attitudes co-evolve with events to determine
their impact. Silva et al. (2016) use natural language processing (NLP) to identify the
groups targeted for hatred on Twitter and Whisper. Farrell et al. (2019) quantify and
track misogyny online: we draw heavily on their lexica in our own abuse detection, as
discussed below.
4https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49247808
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3. Corpus and Methods
In overview, our work investigates a large tweet collection on which a natural language
processing has been performed to enable large scale quantitative analysis. In order
to identify abusive language, the politicians it is targeted at, and the topics in the
politician’s original tweet that tend to trigger abusive replies, we use a set of NLP
tools, combined into a semantic analysis pipeline. It includes, among other things, a
component for MP and candidate recognition, which detects mentions of MPs. Topic
detection finds mentions in the text of political topics (e.g. environment, immigration)
and subtopics (e.g. fossil fuels). The list of topics was derived from the set of topics
used to categorise documents on the gov.uk website5, first seeded manually and then
extended semi-automatically to include related terms and morphological variants using
TermRaider6, resulting in a total of 1046 terms across 44 topics. This methodology is
presented in more detail by Maynard et al. (2017). A more detailed guide to the topics
is also available online.7 We also perform hashtag tokenization, in order to find topic
and abuse terms located within them. In this section we go into more detail regarding
on the key steps of automatic abuse detection and collecting the tweets. We give an
overview of the corpus thus obtained.
3.1. Identifying Abusive Texts
A rule-based approach was used to detect abusive language. An extensive vocabulary
list of slurs, offensive words and potentially sensitive identity markers forms the basis of
the approach.8 The slur list contained 1081 abusive terms or short phrases in British
and American English, comprising mostly an extensive collection of insults. Racist
and homophobic slurs are included as well as various terms that denigrate a person’s
appearance or intelligence. We have included words from the work of Farrell et al.
(2019).
Offensive words such as the “F” word don’t in and of themselves constitute abuse,
but worsen abuse when found in conjunction with a slur, and become abusive when
used with an identity term such as “black”, “Muslim” or “lesbian”. Furthermore, a
sequence of these offensive words in practice is abusive, whereas a single such word
is often not meant as abuse. 131 such words were used; examples include “f**king”,
“sh*t” and “fat”. Similarly, identity words aren’t abusive in and of themselves, but
when used with a slur or offensive word, their presence allows us to type the abuse.
Furthermore in assessing the degree of offensiveness, an attack against an identity
group is usually considered more demeaning than an attack that doesn’t reference
such an aspect of who a person is. The ability to detect abuse where a sensitive term
is coupled with an offensive word, rather than focusing only on slurs, means that more
abuse is detected in this work than in previous work from our group. 451 such words
were used.
Making the approach more precise as to target (whether the abuse is aimed at
the politician being replied to or some third party) was achieved by rules based on
pronoun co-occurrence. In the best case, a tight pronoun phrase such as “you idiot”
5e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies
6https://gate.ac.uk/projects/arcomem/TermRaider.html
7https://gate-socmedia.group.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ICS-paper
-supplementary-materials.docx
8https://gate-socmedia.group.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ICS-paper
-supplementary-materials.docx
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or “idiot like her” is found, that can reliably be used to identify the target. Longer
range pronoun phrases are less reliable but still useful. However, large numbers of
insults contain no such qualification and are targeted at the tweet recipient, such as
for example, simply, “Idiot!”. Unless these are plurals, we count these.
Data from Kaggle’s 2012 challenge, “Detecting Insults in Social Commentary”9,
was used to evaluate the success of the approach. The training set was used to tune
the terms included. On the test set, our approach was shown to have an accuracy
of 80%, and a precision/recall/F1 of 0.72/0.41/0.52. A higher precision is obtainable
through use of tighter pattern matching regarding pronouns, but at the expense of
recall. No particular bias is evident in the abuse detection; the missed phrases are
usually more imaginative and lengthier ways of abusing, which are much harder to
detect. In interpreting the findings presented here, it should be borne in mind that
our method underestimates abuse.
Data-driven approaches have achieved widespread popularity through their typically
superior results, but with the increasing real-world use of prediction systems, concerns
have recently grown about their tendency to contain unwanted bias (Bolukbasi et al.,
2016; Caliskan et al., 2017; Hardt et al., 2016). In the case of abuse detection, an
example would be a system that learns from the training data that men receive more
abuse, so on unseen data uses indicators of a male target, such as a male name, to
classify a text as abusive. Subtler unwanted bias might include stereotyping a partic-
ular cultural group as more likely to be abusive, so labelling texts containing certain
slang as abusive even when they aren’t. An abundance of recent work seeks to address
this problem, e.g. Dixon et al. (2018); Zhao et al. (2018), but critics say more work is
needed (Elazar and Goldberg, 2018; Gonen and Goldberg, 2019; Pleiss et al., 2017).
Our rule-based approach offers peace of mind and a fair performance as discussed
in Greenwood et al. (2019). Additionally, a rule-based approach can be faster, which
is important in processing large tweet collections such as the one used in this work.
Furthermore, a rule-based approach can be easily extended with many rare words
such as those crowdsourced in hatebase.org, which would require a very great deal
of annotated training data to cover.
3.2. Collecting Tweets
The corpus were created by downloading tweets in real-time using Twitter’s streaming
API. The data collection focused on Twitter accounts of MPs, candidates, and official
party accounts. We obtained a list of all current MPs10 (at that time) who had Twitter
accounts.
We used the API to follow the accounts of all MPs over the period of interest. This
means we collected all the tweets sent by each MP, any replies to those tweets, and any
retweets either made by the MP or of the MPs own tweets. Note that this approach
does not collect all tweets which an MP would see in their timeline as it does not
include those in which they are just mentioned. We took this approach as the analysis
results are more reliable due to the fact that replies are directed at the politician who
authored the tweet, and thus, any abusive language is more likely to be directed at
them. Data were of a low enough volume not to be constrained by Twitter rate limits.
Tables 1 and 2 give statistics of the corpus thus collected, which contains a total of
153,878 MP-authored original tweets, 272,555 retweets and 73,707 replies. 7,531,817
9https://www.kaggle.com/c/detecting-insults-in-social-commentary/data
10https://www.mpsontwitter.co.uk/list
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Party White/ White/ Minority/ Minority/ % Fem % Min. Total
Female Male Female /Male
Conservative Party 51 189 6 11 21.3 6.6 257
Labour Party 94 109 18 11 46.3 12.5 232
Scottish National Party 12 23 0 0 34.3 0.0 35
Liberal Democrats 3 7 1 0 30.0 9.1 11
The Independent Group 7 3 0 1 70.0 9.1 11
Democratic Unionist Party 1 7 0 0 12.5 0.0 8
Independent 0 7 0 0 0.0 0.0 7
Sinn Fein 4 3 0 0 57.1 0.0 7
Plaid Cymru 1 3 0 0 25.0 0.0 4
Green Party 1 0 0 0 100.0 0.0 1
Total 174 351 25 23 34.7 8.4 573
Table 1. MP statistics
Date Orig Retw. By Repl. By Repl. To Abusive % Abusive Sig Inc
Jan 25,131 43,758 12,391 980,413 31,650 3.23 N/A
Feb 24,133 43,002 11,396 1,098,061 38,933 3.55 ***
Mar 31,393 55,271 16,082 1,595,854 58,656 3.68 ***
Apr 23,009 42,064 11,906 1,165,899 45,204 3.88 ***
May 21,693 39,812 9,825 1,156,620 46,502 4.02 ***
Jun 27,822 47,763 11,670 1,503,795 72,915 4.85 ***
Table 2. Corpus statistics
replies to politicians were found, of which 3.92% were reckoned to contain abuse.
4. Findings
In this section we present findings under headings pertaining to each of the research
questions in turn. We begin with an overall view of the corpus, that allows us to place
racism and religious intolerance in their context, in terms of events and individuals,
and quantify their importance. Next we investigate religious and racial hatred in more
depth, in the context of other forms of discrimination. Finally we consider how abuse
is experienced temporally by MPs and the impact it may therefore have.
4.1. RQ1: Who Received Abuse, how much, and on what Topics?
Figure 1 presents the abuse received by the MPs during the period studied. Wider
segments indicate a greater volume of abuse received in absolute terms, and darker
segments indicate more abuse as a percentage of all replies received. Therefore a wide,
light segment such as that representing outgoing prime minister Theresa May indicates
that Mrs May received a lot of attention on Twitter, but that it didn’t tend to be
especially abusive quantitatively speaking. The ten most abused MPs by volume are
annotated. Of those, the ethnic minority and mixed race MPs are Sajid Javid, David
Lammy, Diane Abbott, Chuka Umunna and James Cleverly. It is evident at a glance
that most of the abuse is received by a small number of high profile individuals, with
most MPs receiving smaller volumes. An interactive version of the display, in which
other MPs can be viewed and a fixed width version can also be viewed, is available
online.11
Labour MP David Lammy received the most abuse in absolute terms, receiving 11%
of all abuse found in the corpus. Jeremy Corbyn also received a high volume of abuse
11http://demos.gate.ac.uk/politics/race-religion/sunburst.html?file=sunburst
.json
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Figure 1. Who received the most abuse?
(10% of all abuse found). In terms of abuse as a percentage of replies received, Boris
Johnson was the high-profile politician with the highest percentage (8.39%). Other
politicians may receive a higher percentage due to low overall reply volumes. It is
typical for Boris Johnson to receive consistently high percentages of abuse. Theresa
May, Prime Minister at the time of data collection, received the highest volume of
abuse of any female politician. However as a percentage, the level of abuse she receives
is not unusually high (3.72%). Diane Abbott received the second highest volume of
abuse of any female politician, as well as the higher percentage of 6.35%. Theresa May
received 19% of the total abuse sent to women MPs. Diane Abbott received 9%. The
ethnic minority MP receiving the highest volume of abuse was David Lammy, as can
be inferred from his receiving the highest volume of abuse of any MP. His percentage
of abuse received was 6.16%, which is similar to the percentage received by Diane
Abbott (6.35%). David Lammy received almost four times as much abuse by volume
as James Cleverly, who was the ethnic minority MP to receive the second most abuse
by volume.
Some MPs do receive very high percentages of abuse, but where this is part of
a low volume of replies the result may not be statistically significant, or it may be
of less interest where it results from minor local events of less relevance to society.
MPs with the highest percentages of abuse, where the result is statistically significant
and the overall abuse volume is greater than 2,000 tweets are Boris Johnson (8.39%),
Ross Thomson (7.09%), Daniel Kawczynski (6.77%), Diane Abbott (6.35%) and David
Lammy (6.16%).
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Figure 2. Topics attracting abusive replies: heat map
4.1.1. Topics
The dominant topics of the period were “Brexit” (73,000 mentions by MPs), “democ-
racy” (43,000 mentions) and “Europe” (41,000 mentions). “Foreign affairs” and “com-
munity and society” follow with 38,000 mentions. In addition to ongoing discussion
of the exit arrangements, the European Parliament election occurred during this pe-
riod, and was seen as an opportunity to demonstrate and clarify national feeling with
regards to Europe despite the expectation of forfeiting representation in the Euro-
pean Parliament following exit. The will of the people, as ascertained through the
democratic process, is a key concept with regards to Brexit.
In figure 2, topics attracting over 5000 abusive replies across the six-month period
are presented in the form of a heat map. This representation enables us to get a
sense of the comparative abusiveness of many topics across the period that would be
hard to see on a timeline. The data presented is on a per-month basis, and shows
the absolute number of abusive replies that topic attracted in MP tweets. Note that
precise values depend on the coverage of the topic lexicon. However, the dominant
topics of the period are clearly illustrated. Generally speaking we can see that Brexit
was a hot topic, and that feelings ran high in March and June. March is striking for
the emergence of “law and the justice system” and ”equality, rights and citizenship”
as particularly abusive topics. This arose mainly from the case of Shamima Begum.
Law/justice also frequently arises in the context of Brexit: March was the original
month when the UK was planned to leave the EU, so feelings relating to legality ran
high around that time.
In June, US president Donald Trump visited the UK, so it is unsurprising that
“foreign affairs” appeared as an abusive topic in that month. Furthermore Mr Trump
insulted (Muslim) London mayor Sadiq Khan, which led to supportive comments from
among others David Lammy, who then came under fire (though Islam also appeared
in abusive tweets in a variety of other contexts). Other prominent abusive topics were
“defence and the armed forces” and “national security”: Jeremy Corbyn is frequently
abused by being called anti-military and a terrorist sympathizer. David Lammy is
also called a terrorist sympathizer. Antisemitism appears (as a discussion topic: actual
incidence of antisemitism is discussed further below), but Islamophobia does not, as it
8
Figure 3. Topics attracting abusive replies: top MPs
attracted far fewer abusive (and indeed non-abusive) remarks (c. 1,500 as opposed to
over 5,000 abusive). An abusive remark about Islamophobia, as opposed to an actual
Islamophobic remark might be, for example, “you are a stupid Islamophobe”.
Figure 3 shows the topics in MP tweets that drew the most abuse, by volume, in
reply, for the ten individuals receiving the most abuse in absolute terms. The five
most abusive topics for each individual were pooled to create the list of topics shown
in the figure for all individuals. These topics have a “long tail”; many little-mentioned
topics appear. For this reason, there is a substantial “other” category showing the
extent of material that isn’t shown, and would clutter the display to do so. Again,
the focus on Brexit is evident. For two MPs, “community and society” appears as the
topic attracting the most abuse. James Cleverly attracts significantly more abuse for
his tweets on this topic than is typical for the topic (10.6%, where 4.4% is typical,
p<0.001, Fisher’s Exact test). Jess Phillips is the other MP attracting most abuse for
her comments on “community and society”, though in her case this wasn’t significantly
more than expected for the topic. Both MPs have shown a willingness to engage
on the subject of the Labour Party antisemitism debate. Jeremy Corbyn attracted
abuse for his comments on the subject of democracy; 6.0%, where 3.6% is typical
for the topic (p<0.001). This is perhaps because he has been vocal in criticizing the
process around Brexit negotiations and the election of a new leader by the Conservative
Party. The most striking case of an MP attracting abuse for very different topics than
usual, however, is Diane Abbott, who drew abuse for her comments on the subject of
“equality, rights and citizenship” and “law and the justice system”. This arises from
her expressing support for Shamima Begum, a young woman who left the UK to join
ISIL and was subsequently denied repatriation despite mortal risk to her unborn child.
Again, these topics aren’t Ms Abbott’s usual topics; she tweets more on the subject
of “crime and policing” and “community and society”. However, her tweets on the
subject of “equality, rights and citizenship” and “law and the justice system” drew
15.4% and 15.3% abusive replies respectively, where 8.1% and 6.4% respectively are
typical (p<0.001 in both cases).
Figure 4 gives the same topic display but divided along party lines for three parties,
and in this case pooling the seven most abusive topics for each party. In all cases,
9
Figure 4. Topics attracting abusive replies by party
the Brexit/Europe focus is evident. Beyond that, we see some differences however.
The UK economy appears more prominently for the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal
Democrats were the minor partner in a coalition government with the Conservative
Party during the recovery period from the 2007-2008 financial crisis–the austerity
policy was controversial, and forms a theme in these tweets. For both the Conservative
and Labour parties, however, “community and society” (a topic that subsumes Islam
and Judaism) appears prominently as the fourth topic, which it doesn’t for the Liberal
Democrats. This reflects the party religious hatred scandals, though explicit discussion
of antisemitism and Islamophobia was insufficient to appear separately in the graph. (A
comment about “Judaism” for example would count toward “community and society”
but not “antisemitism”, resulting in higher counts for the broader discussion topic, in
which other religions and sexual orientations are also pooled.)
4.2. RQ2: What Hate Speech and Discrimination was Found?
We found 15,500 politically abusive tweets directed at MPs (e.g. “libtard”, “effing
Tory” etc.) and almost 10,000 sexist tweets. We found 5,500 racist tweets directed
at MPs. Homophobic, antisemitic and Islamophobic tweets were fewer in number,
comprising just a few hundred. Racism and sexism are quite broadly defined. We chose
to include for example “stupid man” and “stupid woman” as sexist abuse, a decision
based in part on the observation that “stupid woman” occurs approaching three times
as often in tweets to MPs as “stupid man”, despite women comprising only a third
of MPs. Political abuse might be expected in a corpus of tweets directed at MPs.
Racist abuse includes milder abuse against national groups that aren’t marginalized,
e.g. “bloody French”, and borderline racist terms such as “spiv” and “shyster”, as
well as very extreme racist abuse. However broadly speaking, the quantities found are
indicative of the extent of the phenomena.
We found, as in previous work, that men received more incivility across all types
than women, receiving 2.24% abusive replies (σ=1.76) vs. 1.56 (σ=1.14), a difference
significant at p<0.001 using the MannWhitney test. Women MPs received significantly
more sexist abuse (0.09%, σ=0.11 vs. 0.04%, σ=0.07, p<0.001). The highest volume
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of sexist abuse was received by Theresa May, with over 1,000 sexist abusive replies.
Emily Thornberry was found to have the highest percentage of abusive replies, at
0.52%. David Lammy received the second highest volume of sexist abusive replies
(recall that we include e.g. “stupid man” and “stupid woman”), but at 0.01% of
his replies received, ranks him 12th behind 11 women for percentage of sexist abuse
received. Diane Abbott (0.49%) and Naz Shah (0.37%) receive the second and third
highest percentages of sexist abuse respectively. Men received more political abuse
than women (0.13%, σ=0.14 vs. 0.09%, σ=0.10, p<0.05), a result that echoes Pew
(2017).
Ethnic minority MPs received significantly more racist abuse (0.09%, σ=0.17 vs.
0.04%, σ=0.08, p<0.05). They also received significantly more Islamophobic abuse
(0.008%, σ=0.024 vs. 0.001%, σ=0.005, p<0.001) and antisemitic abuse (0.001%,
σ=0.004 vs. 0.001%, σ=0.008 , p<0.05). As noted above, racism is quite broadly de-
fined in the corpus, so “strong” racist abuse was also investigated. To do so, strength
of abuse was gauged by the number of components of the abuse. For example, “stupid
white idiot” would be counted as having three components, and therefore considered
stronger than “bloody French”, having two components. When considering only strong
racist abuse, i.e. that which had at least three components, ethnic minority MPs re-
ceived again significantly more (0.002%, σ=0.005 vs. 0.001%, σ=0.009, p<0.05). Eth-
nic minority MPs also received significantly more abuse of all types having at least
four components (0.021%, σ=0.032 vs. 0.015%, σ=0.047, p<0.05).
As a percentage and in terms of volume, David Lammy received the most racist
abuse, with 0.22% racist replies and a total number in excess of 1,000. Sajid Javid
received 0.18% racist abuse (200 total), and Diane Abbott received 0.13% (145 total).
Interestingly, the MP receiving the second most racist replies in terms of volume was
Boris Johnson, with almost 300 racist abusive replies (although as a percentage this
was only 0.12%). On inspection, this is because people have used the words “spiv” and
“shyster” to abuse him. These words have some historical association with Judaism,
and Boris Johnson does have some Jewish ancestry, as well as ancestry of various kinds.
It is unclear whether these abusive tweets were intended to have racist connotations in
addition to their main meaning (calling into question Mr Johnson’s honesty)–racism
can be deliberately subtle–or whether no racism was intended. James Cleverly received
182 racist abusive replies, making him fourth after Sajid Javid for overall volume.
Recall that our method of abuse detection is somewhat imprecise, so the numbers
should be taken as approximate.
Conservative MPs received more abuse than Labour Party MPs, with MPs of other
parties too small in number to produce reliable observations. Labour MPs received
1.70% abusive replies (σ=1.46) compared with 2.30% for Conservative MPs (σ=1.70),
a difference significant at p<0.001. Where multiple factors are in play, it is hard to
disentangle the key elements, but previous work (Gorrell et al., 2018) has attempted
a combined model with modest success, and found gender to be the only reliable
predictor of abuse. The greater abuse received by Conservative MPs may arise from
their being in power, and from the gender balance of their MPs. Conservative MPs also
received more racist abuse despite their lower ethnic minority representation, perhaps
because Conservatives draw “spiv” and “shyster” more than Labour politicians, and
because hostility against the English (for example by the Scottish) is counted (0.051%,
σ=0.107 vs. 0.036%, σ=0.081, p<0.01). They draw less Islamophobic abuse (0.001%,
σ=0.007 vs. 0.002%, σ=0.011, p<0.05) and more political abuse (0.150%, σ=0.155 vs.
0.084%, σ=0.101, p<0.001).
Figure 5 shows the abuse types received by those individuals receiving the most
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Figure 5. Abuse types received by high profile MPs
replies in the corpus (who might be considered the highest profile MPs on Twitter).
The amount of political abuse received varies a great deal, and it is interesting that
the incoming prime minister, Boris Johnson, doesn’t tend to attract political abuse.
Diane Abbott is another notable example where the abuse she is receiving doesn’t
obviously focus on her politics. The women politicians shown visibly receive more
sexist abuse. The broad definition of racist abuse is perhaps evident in the fact that
all the politicians shown received a certain amount of racist abuse. In some cases, the
racist abuse is aimed at a third party and has been misclassified. It is visible however
that Sajid Javid is particularly subjected to racist abuse, as is David Lammy, and that
Mr Javid also receives Islamophobic abuse (although in fact he is not religious). There
is also a significant presence of anti-white racism in the corpus, which helps to explain
the notable level of racist abuse across the board.
4.2.1. Antisemitism and Islamophobia
Islamophobia and antisemitism are both significantly more abusive topics than is typi-
cal for the corpus across the six month period (to clarify, discussion of religious hatred
as a topic, rather than the actual execution of it). Antisemitism received three times
as much discussion as Islam, though absolute terms the amount of antisemitic abuse
found in the corpus was slightly lower (194 compared with 233 items, including abuse
aimed at a third party). The disproportionate discussion of antisemitism given the
greater prevalence of Islamophobia in the corpus appears to arise from a large volume
of criticism centred on the Labour Party and Jeremy Corbyn. Almost 80% of the dis-
cussion of replies to MPs about antisemitism were aimed at Labour Party MPs. Actual
overt antisemitic and Islamophobic hate speech in the corpus is relatively rare, but
might be seen as the tip of an iceberg, in that we only detect overt, highly offensive
examples targeted at MPs, and don’t detect subtleties of attitude or prevalence in
society outside of those politically active on Twitter. We included the terms “zio” and
“zionazi” as antisemitism.
Figure 6 shows that explicit discussion of antisemitism and Islamophobia involves
much lower volumes of tweets than the dominant topics of the period, which relate
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Figure 6. Antisemitism and Islamophobia discussion topics
to Brexit. The greater discussion of antisemitism is clearly in evidence. The peak
discussion of antisemitism occurred in early March. Discussion of Islamophobia mainly
occurred throughout March.
4.2.2. The “N” Word
As discussed above, the racism category is broad, but nonetheless the high volumes
of racist abuse are a cause for concern. The word “n****r” is widely considered an
extremely offensive word, though this can depend on context and intent, and offers
an opportunity to explore usage through manual analysis. 299 examples were found of
people using the word, its plural or the “ni**a” spelling variant, in replies to MPs or
former candidates, and one example was found of an MP using that word on Twitter;
David Lammy, discussed below. 185 appearances of the word were in response to
Mr Lammy. Diane Abbott received 19 tweets containing the “N” word. Theresa May
received 18 tweets containing the word. Others received fewer tweets containing the
word.
However usage was extremely varied in its intent. On five occasions, tweets to
Theresa May, the white outgoing prime minister, used the “N” word in the context
of an abusive comment about people of colour. On three occasions, the “N” word was
used as a kind of nickname for Mrs May or other readers, with no sense of offense
implied. On five occasions, usage of the word is discussed, for example regarding Con-
servative MP Anne Marie Morris’ use of the colloquial phrase “n****r in the woodpile”
to mean undisclosed issue12, which caused offense. On five occasions, it was difficult
to discern the intent behind the use of the word. Anne Marie Morris herself received
13 replies discussing her use of the word.
Most usage of the “N” word however centred on David Lammy, largely following
from his late April tweet “Words cannot express how deeply sad it is that in Britain in
2019 we have people who use the word ‘ni**er’ running to be elected officials. This is
an ideology of hate. It must be confronted and defeated.” 131 times, people responded
12https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigger in the woodpile
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to his tweet with a discussion of usage of the word “n***er”–many of these felt that
he had a double standard in using the word himself yet not giving due consideration,
in their opinion, to the intent behind or context of others’ usage. Mr Lammy was
seven times addressed as “n***a” with no apparent offensive intent, probably by other
people of colour. On 23 occasions the word was used to abuse Mr Lammy, however.
On a further nine occasions, the word featured in a reply to Mr Lammy without being
used abusively; however the tweeter abused Mr Lammy using other words or slurs. On
15 occasions it was difficult to discern the intent of the tweeter.
Diane Abbott received four racist/offensive replies using the “N” word. She received
ten replies discussing the use of the word. In one reply, the “n***a” variant is used
as an apparently inoffensive nickname. A further four usages were difficult to classify.
Sajid Javid was abused using the word on four occasions, two of which used the slur
“house n***er”. He also received a reply discussing Anne Marie Morris’ use of the
word. Sadiq Khan was abused using the word on four occasions, two of which were
“sand n***er”. He also received a reply in which the word was used as an inoffensive
nickname.
Out of the 299 replies, 19 (6%) used the “N” word as an inoffensive nickname, all
bar two of those using the “n***a” spelling variant. 184 (62%) discussed use of the
word. 62 replies were offensive (21%), although 12 of those don’t use the “N” word to
give offense, but feature the “N” word as discussion whilst using other words to give
offense. This leaves 50 replies (17%) in which the “N” word was used to abuse and
express hatred. The remaining 44 replies (15%) were unclear in their intent.
4.3. RQ3: Temporal Effects in how Twitter Abuse is Experienced by MPs
The amount of abuse an MP receives in absolute terms doesn’t correspond closely to
the impact it has on them. Abuse is experienced differently depending on social and
personal factors, and similar abuse can be interpreted very differently depending on
context. Pew (2017) reviewed how online abuse is experienced by American private
individuals. They find a great degree of individual variation in how distressing, and
how much of a problem, online abuse is perceived to be, and indeed, what is perceived
as abuse and what isn’t. Pew found it was more common to have been targeted for
political views, with 14% of those surveyed saying they had experienced this, than
physical appearance (9%), race (8%), gender (8%), religion (5%) or sexual orientation
(3%). Men were found to be twice as likely to have been targeted for their political
views, but women were twice as likely as men to have been targeted for their gender.
Being targeted because of race or gender is likely be experienced as more ad hominem,
more dismissive, more damaging, than political views. Pew found that women tended
to experience online abuse as more of a problem than men, which may relate to the
nature of the abuse they receive.
These findings are in keeping with those presented here. It raises the question,
however, of variation in the way abuse is experienced. Temporal effects are a part of
this. Averages over time and total volumes of abuse don’t tend to reflect the abuse
MPs feel compelled to speak out about. A steady trickle or even stream of abuse might
come to be considered par for the course for a prominent public figure, whereas an
intermittent deluge might feel more like bullying. Previous work by Agarwal et al.
(2019) has noted that Twitter attention is focused on MPs in short time windows.
Figure 7 is a good example of this, showing the timeline of abuse received by volume
by the five most abused MPs. Timelines for January/February and May/June are
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Figure 7. % abuse over time: most abused MPs by volume
available in the supplementary materials.13
In this section we therefore employ the metrics used by Agarwal et al to explore the
bursty nature of online abuse; namely, focus, churn and Gini, and how that compares
with the dynamics of (non-abusive) online attention.
4.3.1. Focus
Focus is a measure of how concentrated the abuse activity was for that individual in
the time period covered by the data. Intuitively, the focus window is defined to be the
longest period of consecutive days in which the MP received more than their personal
average of abusive replies. Focus is then the proportion of abuse that fell within this
period. So an MP who had a single burst therefore would have a high focus, whereas
an MP that received more moderately varying levels of abuse would have a low focus.
Formally (from Agarwal et al), for a given MP i and a threshold average abuse level Ti,
a continuous sequence of days R is a high activity window if it satisfies the property:
high activityi(R) :
∑
d∈R
vid > Ti|R|
Where vid is the amount of abuse received by the MP on day d. The focus window
is the longest run. The fraction of abuse received during the focus window, F (T ) is
therefore calculated as follows, where V is the total volume of abuse received by the
MP and vid the abuse received on that day:
F (T ) =
1
Vi
∑
d∈T
vid
13https://gate-socmedia.group.shef.ac.uk/election-analysis-and-hate-speech/
abuse-analysis-q1-2-2019-supplementary-materials/
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MP Focus Norm Foc
Diane Abbott 0.702 20.59
Sajid Javid 0.290 10.21
Rory Stewart 0.497 6.73
Jess Phillips 0.149 5.23
Caroline Lucas 0.142 4.98
Jeremy Hunt 0.328 4.82
Tom Watson 0.188 4.73
Jeremy Corbyn 0.110 3.23
Anna Soubry 0.200 2.94
Boris Johnson 0.211 2.66
Chuka Umunna 0.178 2.61
Nick Boles 0.063 2.22
Theresa May 0.054 1.91
David Lammy 0.085 1.86
James Cleverly 0.037 1.31
Table 3. Focus/normalized focus for most-abused MPs
Focus can be taken a step further by being normalized for the length of the focus
window. Intuitively, we need to distinguish between a long window of somewhat ele-
vated abuse vs. a short window of intense abuse, where both might give the same focus
value. The proportion of abuse expected in a focus window of |R| days is |R|/D. Focus
can therefore be normalized as FiD/|R|. A value of 1 would indicate a uniform abuse
distribution, since the amount of abuse in the focus window matches the amount of
abuse expected for that person in that duration. A high value indicates a focus window
that is marked/unusual.
Table 3 gives focus and normalized focus values for the fifteen MPs who received
the most replies in absolute terms. It is noticeable, as above, that Diane Abbott had
an unusual experience in this period for a prominent MP. Most prominent MPs are
receiving a more consistent level of online abuse. Sajid Javid shows a similar pattern
but to a lesser extent. We see that David Lammy receives a steady high level of abuse,
not the steady lower level or bursty low level that are more common for high profile
and lower profile MPs respectively.
No significant difference was found in focus metrics between genders, ethnic groups
or the two main parties, suggesting that focus may be of interest as a metric of response
to individuals and events (though that response may be a complex one depending on
ethnicity among other things).
Figure 8 shows the distribution of focus values for all MPs. It shows that most MPs
(around 80%) have less than half of their abuse concentrated in a focus window. It
differs from the graph shown by Agarwal et al, in which they plot all tweets received,
not just the abusive ones, in that they find even more MPs (around 90%) have focus
values of 0.5 or below. The suggestion is that a minority of MPs are receiving very
bursty attention, but that abuse is experienced as bursty for more MPs.
Figure 9 plots normalized focus. We find 80% of MPs having a normalized focus of
40 or less. Again, this differs from Agarwal et al ’s result for all Twitter attention in
that they find 80% of MPs have a normalized focus of around 6 or less. This suggests
that abuse is an exaggeration of the normal variation in social media attention received
by a public figure, which might increase its detrimental impact on an MP.
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Figure 8. Focus
Figure 9. Normalized focus
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4.3.2. Churn and Gini
Agarwal et al also define churn as a measure of the rate of change of focus over adjacent
time slices. An “active” MP in time slice R (which could be one or several days) is
one who is currently in their focus window. Therefore:
Churn(R) =
|active(R)∆active(R+)|
|active(R) ∪ active(R+)|
Figure 10 gives a box plot for churn values for timeslices of one to ten days, echoing
Agarwal et al ’s plot but for abusive rather than all tweets. Intuitively, we take a sliding
window of n days and calculate the churn of active users between the adjacent slices
for each timestep. This gives a value for each timestep, the set of which are described
using a box in the plot, to tell us something about that window size, before increasing
n and repeating. Our work shows an interesting difference in comparison to Agarwal
et al ’s. For all tweets, according to Agarwal et al ’s work, churn increases as window
size increases. We, however, find churn decreases as window size increases. Intuitively,
a larger sliding window has more material in common with the previous slice, so our
result doesn’t seem unexpected. For a one day window it seems reasonable to make a
direct comparison. Here we find churn is higher for abuse than Agarwal et al report
for all tweets.
A further metric of interest is the inequality of abuse distribution within a timeslice,
as demonstrated using the well-known Gini coefficient. We have again created a box
plot mirroring Agarwal et al ’s, showing different time slice durations, in figure 11.
This time, our finding of a lower Gini for larger timeslices echoes Agarwal et al ’s, and
once more we find Gini is higher for abuse than for all tweets. We also find our range
of Ginis remains wider for longer time windows, again demonstrating the especially
sporadic and bursty nature of abusive online attention.
In summary, churn and Gini box plots, compared with Agarwal et al ’s findings,
show that whilst online attention is already bursty, tending to glob together on
events/individuals of interest, online abuse is even more so. This makes it more un-
predictable and marked.
5. Discussion
Previous work about online abuse of UK MPs is continued here with a study of Q1 &
2, 2019. Against a backdrop of tensions regarding the UK’s exit from the European
Union, and higher levels of online abuse toward MPs than we have previously observed,
we take the opportunity to look more closely at religious and racial dynamics, as they
evolve partly following from “Brexit” and partly as part of the global picture.
We found that several high profile ethnic minority MPs received substantial racist
abuse on Twitter. David Lammy received the most abuse by volume. Diane Abbott
received a significant volume of racial abuse. Sajid Javid and James Cleverly were also
subjected to strong racial slurs. James Cleverly was the ethnic minority MP receiving
the second highest volume of general abuse, behind David Lammy. We found that Mr
Lammy received unusually high levels of abuse in response to his tweets about race.
Ms Abbott received unusually high levels of abuse in response to her tweets about the
repatriation of a young Muslim woman. Ethnic minorities received more racist and
Islamophobic abuse and women received more sexist abuse.
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Figure 10. Churn
Figure 11. Gini
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In terms of more general abuse, incoming prime minister Boris Johnson attracts
the highest proportion of abuse (as opposed to volume) of any high profile politician.
As in previous work, we found men receive more general abuse, as do Conservative
politicians, possibly due to the higher proportion of men in the Conservative party, or
because they are the ruling party.
Antisemitism in the Labour Party and Islamophobia in the Conservative party
were topics that attracted attention during this period, echoing a sense of polarization
around identity politics that is also evident in responses to David Lammy’s and Diane
Abbott’s tweets. The topic of community and society, which includes Muslim and
Jewish communities, as well as LGBT+ identities, appeared second only to Brexit,
Europe and Democracy for both the Labour and Conservative parties. We found more
discussion of antisemitism than discussion of Islamophobia despite slightly higher levels
of actual Islamophobic abuse.
David Lammy’s engagement with the subject of the “N” word during the period
studied provided an opportunity to investigate in more depth responses to that word
and the way it is used. The dominant use of the word was to discuss its usage. The
second most frequent way of using the word is as a strong racial slur, often in conjunc-
tion with other offensive words. Significant usage also treats the word as a harmless
nickname, however, especially the “n**ga” spelling variant, particularly “my ni**a”.
For most MPs, abuse is bursty, more so than general online attention, which is also
highly bursty. We suggest this may affect how it is perceived, as an occasional deluge
may have greater shock value than a steady trickle. This is a matter for future inves-
tigation. Burstiness of abuse varied widely between MPs, however, and is suggestive
of a response to personal factors that may mean different MPs are having consistently
different experiences. Diane Abbott received particularly sudden deluges compared
with other prominent politicians. On the other hand, the sustained high level of abuse
received by David Lammy is also a matter of concern. Future work is needed to explore
focus and normalized focus as consistent characteristics of individuals in the public
eye, as this may yield insights into what causes this difference in response and what
the consequences are for individuals and for politics.
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